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IN CONSPICUOUS TERMS—ARBITRATION 
AGREEMENTS FOR THE MODERN 
REASONABLE APP USER 
MICHELLE DUNBAR* 
ABSTRACT 
 Two recent decisions regarding the validity of arbitration 
agreements in mobile apps have come to opposite conclusions 
despite utilizing the same legal standard and concerning the same 
app—Uber. While the Federal Arbitration Act strongly favors the 
validity and importance of arbitration agreements, it appears 
that judge’s subjectivity based on common knowledge and under-
standing of apps is influencing the outcome of cases concerning 
the validity of these arbitration agreements. To the modern app 
user, are these terms really inconspicuous? For businesses, this 
could mean that instead of competing in an already saturated app 
market by enhancing their design and integrating branding into 
their mobile app’s user interface, they may have to concern them-
selves more with compromising their branding strategy to comply 
with a legal standard that demands the terms to be the most con-
spicuous standard to include the common knowledge and under-
standing of app users into the perspective of the reasonable app 
users that courts use to analyze the conspicuousness of terms. By 
encompassing this heightened knowledge, reasonable access to 
terms, rather than the level of conspicuousness of terms, should 
suffice for putting a user on inquiry notice. Such a standard allow-
ing for reasonable access should both accurately reflect the cur-
rent knowledge and allow for further item to the user. This Note 
proposes a potential redefined advancements in the understanding 
of mobile technology. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The standard for determining the validity of arbitration 
agreements in apps and new digital technology is unclear. The 
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) expresses “a liberal federal policy 
favoring arbitration agreements.”1 However, by using a reasonable 
person standard to determine (i) whether someone has received 
notice of an arbitration agreement and (ii) whether the arbitra-
tion agreement has been agreed to in smartphone applications, 
courts allow subjective biases to creep into this inquiry which 
may vary from judge to judge, making the standard unclear.2 If 
the FAA reads so liberally in favor of arbitration, how is it that 
the judicial interpretation has differed on the validity of arbitra-
tion terms for the same company’s app and terms?3 
 Two recent cases, Cullinane v. Uber Technologies, Inc. and 
Meyer v. Uber Technologies, Inc., came to opposite conclusions 
regarding the validity of arbitration agreements despite the con-
troversy stemming from the same app—Uber.4 In Cullinane, the 
plaintiffs filed a class action against Uber, asserting that Uber im-
posed fictitious or inflated fees; Uber, in turn, filed a motion to 
compel arbitration due to the arbitration agreement contained in 
the app’s Terms and Conditions.5 The First Circuit analyzed the 
validity of Uber’s arbitration agreement by evaluating whether 
the terms of the agreement were reasonably communicated to 
the plaintiffs.6 As a mobile contract, the court looked to whether 
the terms were conspicuous within the design and context of the 
interface.7 For these plaintiffs, Uber’s registration screen con-
sisted of a black background with white and gray text, contain-
ing a total of twenty-six words.8 The First Circuit stated that 
“[i]f everything on the screen is written in conspicuous features, 
then nothing is conspicuous.” It held that Uber’s bold, white, 
hyperlinked terms—including its arbitration agreement—were 

1 Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 74 (2d Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). 
2 See Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 62–64 (1st Cir. 2018); 
Meyer, 868 F.3d at 77–78. 
3 See Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 63–64; Meyer, 868 F.3d at 78–79. 
4 Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 63–64; Meyer, 868 F.3d at 78–79. 
5 Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 55, 59. 
6 Id. at 61–62. 
7 Id. at 62. 
8 Id. at 56–58, 62–63. 
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not sufficiently conspicuous in terms of the context of the screen 
to put users on inquiry notice of the terms.9 
 Similarly, in Meyer, the plaintiffs filed a class action alleging 
that the app allowed drivers to fix prices.10 Again, Uber moved 
to compel arbitration based on the app’s Terms of Service.11 The 
Second Circuit also utilized a “reasonably conspicuous notice” 
standard from the perspective of a reasonable smartphone user.12 
Taking a seemingly more progressive view on the pervasiveness 
and knowledge of mobile devices and users, the Second Circuit 
held that in the context of the entire interface, there was “ample 
evidence that a reasonable user would be on inquiry notice of the 
terms.”13 In actuality, the screens in both Cullinane and Meyer 
contain much the same language and design features;14 the dis-
crepancy appears to turn on Uber’s branding and design during 
the relevant time period.15 
 The standard for determining whether someone has been 
provided notice of an arbitration agreement and whether they 
have agreed to those terms should be more clearly defined to 
better encompass the breadth of common knowledge of users of 
different smartphones and other pervasive technology.16 A po-
tential resolution would be to incorporate the understanding of a 
reasonable person from the perspective of an app user.17 Such a 
standard would account for the specialized common knowledge 
held by the current paradigm of app users by tailoring the legal 
standard to what is commonplace in this technological era, thus 
ensuring its adaptability for future changes.18 Instead of the 
traditional common law test of notice for determining the validity 
of arbitration agreements, agreement to terms should turn on 
whether there is reasonable access.19 If a modern app user has 

9 Id. at 62–64. 
10 Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 2017). 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 77–78. 
13 Id. at 77, 79. 
14 See infra Section II.E, Figure 1; Figure 2. 
15 See Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 62–64 (1st Cir. 2018); 
Meyer, 868 F.3d at 78–79. 
16 See infra Section II.F. 
17 See infra Part III. 
18 See id. 
19 See infra Section III.B. 
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reasonable access to the terms during and after registration, their 
use of the app expresses an outward manifestation of assent to 
the terms by nature of their knowledge and understanding of 
what use of the app entails.20 Provided that an app user has 
reasonable access to the terms, such user should be subject to 
the terms in apps.21 
I.ARBITRATION CLAUSES AND THEIR IMPORTANCE IN 
CONSUMER CONTRACTS 
A.The Federal Arbitration Act and Contract Law 
 The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) was enacted by Congress 
in 1925 in order to ensure validity and enforcement of arbitration 
agreements subject to the Act, construed to be those agreements 
that “affect[ ] interstate commerce in any way.”22 Section 2 of the 
Act states that:  
A written provision in any ... contract evidencing a transaction 
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy there-
after arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal 
to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in 
writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising 
out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist 
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.23 
Given that arbitration agreements had historically been 
treated with hostility in the law, the purpose of this section was 
“to place arbitration agreements ‘upon the same footing as other 
contracts, where [they] belong.’”24 For that reason, the Act 
preempts state law that would otherwise invalidate arbitration 

20 See id. 
21 See id. 
22 JON O. SHIMABUKURO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30934, THE FEDERAL AR-
BITRATION ACT: BACKGROUND AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 1 (2002); Michael L. 
Ehren, Getting Your Day Outside of Court: A Guide to Compelling Arbitration 
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, A.B.A. (Dec. 9, 2014), https://www.ameri 
canbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/the_101_201_practice_series/
compelling_arbitration_under_faa/ [https://perma.cc/Y2R9-DFFZ]. 
23 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
24 Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991); 
SHIMABUKURO, supra note 22, at 2 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 96, 68th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 1 (1924)). 
536 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:531 
agreements.25 State law invalidation would “frustrate congres-
sional intent” to maintain the Act’s even footing with contracts.26 
Section 2 of the FAA also emphasizes “congressional declaration 
of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.”27 The 
extent of that favor has been interpreted such that as a matter 
of federal law, “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable 
issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”28 
 Businesses are increasingly utilizing arbitration clauses 
as part of their user agreements and user contracts “as a way to 
quickly and quietly resolve disputes” in lieu of costly, burdensome 
litigation.29 Part of the appeal to businesses is the sense of sta-
bility and predictability that arbitration agreements provide given 
the FAA’s favor of arbitration and aversion to class action.30 
 By making arbitration agreements commensurate with con-
tracts and favoring arbitration over litigation when interpreting 
arbitration agreements, courts allow businesses to control the 
amount of legal risk they take on.31 In arbitration agreements, use 
of clear language that details how parties are obligated to act 
mitigates risk associated with class action suits and the burdens 
of time and expense associated with litigation.32 Arbitration 

25 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14–16 (1984). 
26 Id. at 15–16; SHIMABUKURO, supra note 22, at 4. 
27 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 
(1983). 
28 Id. 
29 Jason Cheung, Business Use of Arbitration Clauses, LEGAL MATCH (May 2, 
2018), https://www.legalmatch.com/law-library/article/business-use-of-arbitra 
tion-clauses.html [https://perma.cc/4SRK-QWQU]. 
30 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011) (“Requiring 
the availability of classwide arbitration interferes with fundamental attrib-
utes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.”); 
Tom Hagy, The Future of Mandatory Arbitration Shock: Sides Square Off in 
Consumer Contracts and Employment Arenas, LexisNexis Corporate Law 
Advisory (May 18, 2017), https://www.lexisnexis.com/communities/corporate 
counselnewsletter/b/newsletter/archive/2017/05/18/the-future-of-mandatory-ar 
bitration-shock-sides-square-off-in-consumer-contracts-and-employment-arenas 
.aspx [https://perma.cc/QQ9Z-B8XD]. 
31 Robert Fojo, 12 Reasons Businesses Should Use Arbitration Agreements, 
LEGAL IO (May 11, 2015), https://www.legal.io/guide/5550f4df77777765ebb80 
100/12-Reasons-Businesses-Should-Use-Arbitration-Agreements [https://perma 
.cc/88SK-4UK3]. 
32 Id. 
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agreements accomplish this by providing companies with the 
flexibility of choosing the details of dispute resolution.33 Compa-
nies can pick an arbitrator, keep matters private, and choose where 
they arbitrate.34 
 The FAA sets out a “policy guaranteeing the enforcement 
of private contractual arrangements,” thereby honoring arbitration 
agreements.35 By enforcing such agreements in favor of arbitra-
tion, courts realize this policy of the FAA.36 Notwithstanding the 
FAA’s favor of arbitration agreements, the determination of 
whether a claim is arbitrable is still subject to (1) the existence 
of a valid agreement to arbitrate, (2) the claim falling within the 
scope of the arbitration agreement, and (3) the claim not being 
precluded from arbitration by applicable law.37 Thus, a frequently 
contested issue in consumer contracts is whether an agreement 
has been made for courts to honor.38 Despite the proliferation of 
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts,39 much litigation and 
debate over these clauses stems from whether there was notice 
of the terms such that a consumer has agreed to the clause.40 
 Per the FAA, there must be a valid agreement in order for 
an arbitration agreement to be enforceable.41 Like in the context of 
contracts, parties are not required to arbitrate unless they have 

33 See Jean Murray, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Business Agree-
ments, THE BALANCE SMALL BUSINESS (May 31, 2018), https://www.thebal 
ancesmb.com/mandatory-arbitration-clauses-in-business-agreements-397425 
[https://perma.cc/Q64L-3XQS]; Fojo, supra note 31. 
34 Murray, supra note 33. 
35 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 625 
(1985). 
36 Id. 
37 See Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 20–22 (2d Cir. 2002); 
Ehren, supra note 22. 
38 See generally Mandy Walker, The Arbitration Clause Hidden in Many 
Consumer Contracts and the Consumer Rights You’re Giving Away as a Result, 
CONSUMER REPORTS (Sept. 29, 2015), https://www.consumerreports.org/cro 
/shopping/the-arbitration-clause-hidden-in-many-consumer-contracts [https:// 
perma.cc/LL7Q-WTDE]. 
39 Id. 
40 See, e.g., Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 232–33 (2d Cir. 2016); 
Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1175–77 (9th Cir. 2014); C. Celeste 
Creswell, Arbitration Clauses in Online Agreements, UBIQUITY (June 2000), 
https://ubiquity.acm.org/article.cfm?id=339334 [https://perma.cc/4JD9-94MA]. 
41 Ehren, supra note 22. 
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agreed to do so.42 This threshold question of whether there was an 
agreement to arbitrate is determined by state contract law prin-
ciples because arbitration is treated as “a matter of contract be-
tween the parties.”43 Therefore, as with any other contract, the 
parties’ intentions control on this issue.44 Even so, parties’ inten-
tions “are generously construed as to issues of arbitrability.”45 
Accordingly, courts appear to construe arbitration clauses in con-
sumer contracts in favor of arbitration lest the agreement emerged 
from fraud or undue influence.46 
 As the scope of the FAA has been broadly construed to en-
compass congressional intent and federal policy favoring arbi-
tration,47 courts generally resolve any doubts regarding scope in 
favor of arbitration.48 Thus, the final determinant of arbitrability 
(whether the arbitration agreement is precluded by applicable 
law) only becomes relevant if a statute specifically precludes waiver 
of judicial remedies by arbitration agreement.49 Otherwise, stat-
utory claims are arbitrable.50 
B.Business Use of Arbitration Agreements and Arbitration’s 
Impact on Business 
 The use of arbitration agreements provides many benefits 
to businesses, from saving time and expenses, to keeping any 
potential claims brought against the company confidential.51 Given 

42 Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 2012). 
43 Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 229 (citations omitted). 
44 Gregory Klass, Interpretation and Construction in Contract Law, THE 
SCHOLARLY COMMONS (Jan. 19, 2018) (draft at 1), http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=2913228 [https://perma.cc/RA9A-S2WF] (“When faced with questions of contract 
interpretation, courts commonly begin with the principle that ‘[t]he primary 
goal in interpreting contracts is to determine and enforce the parties’ in-
tent.’”) (quoting Old Kent Bank v. Sobczak, 243 Mich. App. 57, 63 (2000)). 
45 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 626 
(1985). 
46 Id. at 627 (“[A]bsent such compelling considerations, the Act itself pro-
vides no basis for disfavoring agreements to arbitrate statutory claims by 
skewing the otherwise hospitable inquiry into arbitrability.”). 
47 Id.; Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 22 
(1983). 
48 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24–25. 
49 Ehren, supra note 22. 
50 Id. 
51 See Susan K. Leader & Jenna Nalchajian, INSIGHT: The Brightening 
Spotlight on Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, BLOOMBERG LAW (Aug. 24, 2018), 

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the strong favor of arbitration by the FAA, businesses are better 
able to predict and manage legal risk in an “effective and pre-
dictable fashion.”52 If a business does not include a mandatory 
arbitration agreement into consumer contracts, it could substan-
tially raise the cost of business by opening the door to the possi-
bility of consumer class action litigation.53 In addition, arbitration 
saves time by streamlining the legal requirements of litigation.54 
For example, arbitration curtails otherwise broader rules for 
discovery and simplifies the applicable rules of civil procedure 
and evidence.55 A business can also select arbitrators that have 
specialized knowledge or experience.56 Further, arbitrations are 
confidential, as opposed to public court proceedings, and arbitra-
tion awards have little appeal rights and bases to vacate.57 
 The primary “strategic advantage” that businesses gain 
by using arbitration clauses is in the decreased risk of class actions 
that they may otherwise face.58 Class actions can be risky for busi-
nesses because of the possibility of substantial loss and heavy 
expense for the company.59 Class actions create such a risk by 
making otherwise worthless individual claims worthwhile through 

https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/insight-the-brightening-spot 
light-on-mandatory-arbitration-clauses [https://perma.cc/6EZ3-2FLZ]; Fojo, 
supra note 31. 
52 Fojo, supra note 31. 
53 Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not 
Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 433, 467 (2010); Fojo, 
supra note 31. 
54 Fojo, supra note 31. 
55 Id.; Jay N. Varon & Jennifer M. Keas, Shouldn’t You Be Using Arbitra-
tion Agreements to Reduce Costs of Litigation and Risk of Class Action Claims?, 
NAT. L. REV. (May 10, 2017), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/shouldn-t 
-you-be-using-arbitration-agreements-to-reduce-costs-litigation-and-risk [https:// 
perma.cc/CG39-UQJ3]. 
56 Varon & Keas, supra note 55. 
57 Id. 
58 Drahozal & Ware, supra note 53, at 467–68 (“[Arbitration clauses] pre-
vent class actions and remit consumers to individual actions which, in light of the 
stakes, are usually not worthwhile to pursue.”) (quoting Eisenberg et al., Arbitra-
tion’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer 
and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 888 (2008)). 
59 Gregory Brown, What Are Class Actions and How Do They Impact Busi-
nesses?, BROWN & CHARBONNEAU, LLP (July 25, 2017), https://www.bc-llp.com 
/class-actions-impact-businesses/ [https://perma.cc/W2AU-SXKL]. 
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pooled resources and reduced expenses.60 By aggregating the 
number of plaintiffs and the resources dedicated to litigation, 
class action suits create “overwhelming settlement pressure.”61 
This pressure stems from the high cost of defending large suits 
and the possibility of having to pay out a large verdict.62 Settle-
ment itself is often expensive due to paying out a large number 
of class members.63 
 The FAA allows businesses to reduce the risk of class ac-
tions by allowing class action arbitration proceedings only where 
the parties “express agreement is apparent from the contract.”64 
The FAA does not allow class action arbitration where the agree-
ment is “silent as to whether such proceedings are permissi-
ble.”65 By agreeing to terms containing a mandatory arbitration 
agreement, a consumer must pursue individual arbitration instead 
of class action claims.66 However, individual arbitration requires 
a high investment of time and money and thus is pursued as 
infrequently as solo litigation.67 
II.DETERMINING AGREEMENT TO TERMS BY PROVIDING 
NOTICE OF ARBITRATION 
A.Arbitration Clauses Are Determined by State Contract Law 
 The threshold question of whether an arbitration clause is 
valid is determined by state-specific contract law.68 Many states’ 
contract laws are similar regarding whether parties have agreed 
to contract terms.69 However, other differences in state contract 

60 Drahozal & Ware, supra note 53, at 467–68 (“[F]ew consumers will seek re-
dress on an individual basis due to lack of information or the small amounts 
in dispute.”). 
61 Id. at 468. 
62 Brown, supra note 59. 
63 Drahozal & Ware, supra note 53, at 468; Brown, supra note 59. 
64 Richard Glucksman, Arbitration Law as We Move Into 2017, AMWINS 
GROUP, INC. (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.amwins.com/docs/default-source/In 
sights/clientadvisory_arbitration-laws-1-1797c68c070c5e6535a197ff0000da17 
6d.pdf?sfvrsn=6198e95f_2 [https://perma.cc/T9KB-36E5]. 
65 Id. 
66 Brown, supra note 59. 
67 Id. 
68 Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 74 (2d Cir. 2017). 
69 See Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2012) (stating 
in reference to which states’ law applied to the case, “neither that court nor 

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law could be a factor for businesses to weigh in consideration of 
choice of law for their contracts.70 In most states, the proper inquiry 
is whether the parties have shown an outward manifestation of 
assent to a contract and its terms.71 The Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts defines conduct expressing manifestation of assent 
as “words or silence, action or inaction” so long as the party “in-
tends to engage in the conduct and knows or has reason to know 
that the other party may infer from his conduct that he assents.”72 
Mutual assent is based on an objective standard “applied to the 
outward manifestations or expressions of the parties.”73 
 Online- or application-based businesses have created new 
scenarios for courts to interpret contract law.74 However, they 
have not changed the way that contract principles are applied to 
them.75 As discussed below, assent to online contracts can be 
determined through applying traditional contract principles to 
new methods of assent, such as clickwrap or browsewrap agree-
ments.76 Nonetheless, all iterations of contracts require the same 
display of intent to engage in the contracted conduct such that 
others could infer assent.77 

this one need resolve this typically thorny choice-of-law question, because 
both Connecticut and California apply substantially similar rules for deter-
mining whether the parties have mutually assented to a contract term”). 
70 See D.C. Toedt, Choice-of-Law Cheat Sheet for Contract Negotiators, ON 
CONTRACTS (July 9, 2009), https://www.oncontracts.com/cheat-sheets/choice-of 
-law-crib-sheet/ [https://perma.cc/K5BK-XH6T]. 
71 See Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 61–62 (1st Cir. 2018); 
Meyer, 868 F.3d at 74; Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 232 (2d Cir. 
2016); Schnabel, 697 F.3d at 119–20. 
72 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 19(2) (1965); see Schnabel, 697 F.3d 
at 120. 
73 Schnabel, 697 F.3d at 119 (quoting Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. AMZ Ins. 
Servs., Inc., 188 Cal. App. 4th 401, 422 (2010)). 
74 Meyer, 868 F.3d at 75. 
75 Id. 
76 Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 232–33 (“Clickwraps force users to ‘expressly and 
unambiguously manifest either assent or rejection prior to being given access 
to the product.’”) (quoting Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 429 
(2d Cir. 2004)). 
77 Id. at 232 (stating that manifestation of assent for online contracts “can 
be accomplished by ‘words or silence, action or inaction,’ so long as the user 
‘intends to engage in the conduct and knows or has reason to know that the 
other party may infer from his conduct that he assents.’”) (quoting Schnabel, 
697 F.3d at 120). 
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 Further, regardless of an offeree’s outward manifestations 
of assent, in most states the offeree is not bound “by inconspicu-
ous contractual provisions of which he is unaware, contained in 
a document whose contractual nature is not obvious.”78 This 
requires that the terms of the agreement be reasonably commu-
nicated to the person accepting the agreement.79 Nonetheless, if 
an offeree has no actual notice of an arbitration agreement, he or 
she would still be bound by a provision if the offeree is on “inquiry 
notice of the term and assents to it through the conduct that a 
reasonable person would understand to constitute assent.”80 For 
example, the state of Washington provides two circumstances that 
put an offeree on inquiry notice: (1) when the offeree has reason 
to know that a term exists from all facts and circumstances 
known to him at the time, or (2) if the offeree has received notifi-
cation of the information from someone who took steps that would 
have been reasonably required to inform the offeree.81 
 Given this interpretation, courts tend to apply a two-step 
inquiry to determine (1) whether the terms of the agreement were 
reasonably communicated (i.e., reasonably conspicuous notice), and 
(2) whether there was agreement to those terms as evidenced by 
an outward manifestation of assent.82 
 California and Massachusetts, the states at issue in Cul-
linane and Meyer, are examples of utilizing the same standard 
for determining the existence of an agreement to terms of the 
same app based on each states’ individual contract laws.83 Both 
states, when approaching Uber’s terms of agreement, asked 
whether there was sufficient notice of the arbitration clause based 
on the clarity and conspicuousness of the terms presented, fol-
lowed by whether there was assent to those terms.84 Regardless of 
a showing or manifestation of assent, offerees in both jurisdictions 
are not bound by contractual terms that are inconspicuous.85 
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78 Meyer, 868 F.3d at 74 (quoting Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 
F.3d 17, 30 (2d Cir. 2002)). 
79 Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 61 (1st Cir. 2018).  
80 Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 233 (quoting Schnabel, 697 F.3d at 120). 
81 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.1-202(a)(3), (d); Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 233. 
82 See, e.g., Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 62; Meyer, 868 F.3d 77–80; Nicosia, 834 
F.3d at 236–37. 
83 See Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 61–62; Meyer, 868 F.3d at 74–75. 
84 Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 61–62; Meyer, 868 F.3d at 74–75. 
85 Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 61; Meyer, 868 F.3d at 74–75 (discussing the va-
lidity of web-based and electronic contracts) (“There is nothing automatically 

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Thus, the crux of the issue presented by the differing outcomes of 
Cullinane and Meyer is based on the level of conspicuousness of the 
terms presented to each set of app users, despite the two states 
applying the same legal standard to the same smartphone app.86 
B.Online Agreements—Clickwrap, Browsewrap & Continuously 
Evolving Methods of Agreement 
 Despite technology continually changing and advancing, 
presenting the courts with new situations, courts continue to rely 
on the same principles of notice and assent from contract law in 
determining the validity of arbitration agreements in online- and 
application-based terms of conditions or user contracts.87 While 
the same primary legal principles apply, the ever-changing 
means of conveying terms require different analyses to deter-
mine whether notice and assent are met.88 Courts regularly up-
hold clickwrap agreements because the user must affirmatively 
assent to the terms of agreement by clicking “I agree”; if the user 
does not agree, they will be disabled from accessing or utilizing 
the site or application.89 Courts have found that such an elec-
tronic “‘click can suffice to signify the acceptance of a contract’” 
provided that the user has reasonable notice.90 
 Alternatively, browsewrap agreements do not require an 
express assent to the terms by an affirmative action.91 A user of 
a website or application agrees to the terms of the site itself by 
merely visiting the site.92 In the browsewrap context, the terms 
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offensive about such agreements, as long as the layout and language of the 
site give the user reasonable notice that a click will manifest assent to an 
agreement.”) (quoting Sgouros v. TransUnion Corp., 817 F.3d 1029, 1033–34 
(7th Cir. 2016)). 
86 See Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 62–64; Meyer, 868 F.3d at 77–78. 
87 Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 62–63; Meyer, 868 F.3d at 75. 
88 See Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 62–63; Meyer, 868 F.3d at 75–76; Nicosia v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 232–34 (2d Cir. 2016); Nguyen v. Barnes & 
Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1175–77 (9th Cir. 2014). 
89 See Meyer, 868 F.3d at 75; Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 233 (“Clickwraps force 
users to ‘expressly and unambiguously manifest either assent or rejection prior 
to being given access to the product.’” (quoting Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 
356 F.3d 393, 429 (2d Cir. 2004))). 
90 Meyer, 868 F.3d at 75 (quoting Sgouros, 817 F.3d at 1033–34). 
91 Id. at 75; Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1176. 
92 Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1176. 
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are available via hyperlink somewhere on the website, but a user 
does not have to view or click to accept the terms before using the 
site.93 These too are regularly enforced by courts so long as the 
user had actual notice of the agreement.94 However, when there is 
no actual notice, the validity of browsewrap and other web-based 
agreements can be established if the website or application “puts 
a reasonably prudent user on inquiry notice of the terms of the 
contract.”95 Inquiry notice for arbitration agreements in web-
based contracts “turns on the ‘[c]larity and conspicuousness of 
the arbitration terms’” which are a “function of the design and 
content of the relevant interface.”96 Thus, the validity of browse-
wrap agreements depends on knowledge, either actual or con-
structive, of the terms and conditions based predominantly on 
the conspicuousness of the terms on the user interface.97 
 Because new technology and user platforms are constantly 
being created, updated, and redesigned, there are a myriad of ways 
to design online and mobile electronic user contracts which do 
not neatly fit into either the clickwrap or browsewrap catego-
ries.98 For this reason, courts have generally found terms of 
agreement valid on various interfaces if the existence of the terms 
were reasonably communicated to the user.99 Yet, as user un-
derstanding is advancing in step with technology,100 the courts’ 
interpretations as to what is reasonably communicated appears 
to be lagging behind.101 
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93 See id. 
94 Id. (“[C]ourts have consistently enforced browsewrap agreements where 
the user had actual notice of the agreement.”). 
95 Id. at 1177; see Meyer, 868 F.3d at 74–75. 
96 Meyer, 868 F.3d at 75. 
97 See id.; Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 233 (2d Cir. 2016). 
98 See Meyer, 868 F.3d at 75. 
99 See id.; Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 233. 
100 See Michael H. Payne, Technology Learning Curve Requires Patience, but 
It’s Worth It (Jan. 21, 2019), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/technology-learn 
ing-curve-requires-patience-012127183.html [https://perma.cc/P8KZ-BYNH]; 
John Smith, 7 Technologies We Can Expect to Be Commonplace Soon (Feb. 3, 
2016), https://www.business2community.com/tech-gadgets/7-technologies-can 
-expect-commonplace-soon-01445748 [https://perma.cc/XCQ9-TKVA].  
101 Compare Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 839 F.3d 53, 63–64 (1st Cir. 
2018), with Meyer, 868 F.3d at 77–78. 
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C.Determining Reasonably Conspicuous Notice 
 Whether a web-based user has inquiry notice of the terms 
of an agreement depends on the clarity and conspicuousness of 
the terms.102 An agreement’s clarity and conspicuousness is de-
termined by looking to “the design and content of the relevant 
interface.”103 This includes whether there is clutter on the screen, 
the user has to scroll to see the terms, there is a lack of con-
trasting colors or fonts that stand out from the rest of the screen, 
or the terms are linked in “obscure sections of a webpage that 
users are unlikely to see.”104 Some examples of characteristics 
that make terms more conspicuous are larger and contrasting 
fonts, capital letter headings, or otherwise setting the terms off 
from surrounding text by use of symbols or other marks.105 In 
addition, terms can be considered more conspicuous if they are 
spatially oriented near “the mechanism for manifesting assent” 
and if the terms are temporally coupled with the manifestation 
of agreement, by noting acceptance to terms as a consumer is 
registering for or purchasing from a website or app.106 The level 
of conspicuousness of terms is subject to a reasonable person 
standard.107 Such a malleable and subjective standard opens the 
door to varying interpretations of the conspicuousness of terms 
in the realm of apps.108 
D.A Reasonable Person Standard’s Correlation to Reasonably 
Conspicuous Notice 
 A reasonable person standard is used to judge the con-
spicuousness of the terms to determine whether a website or app 
user had notice of electronic terms of agreement.109 The reasonable 
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102 See Meyer, 868 F.3d at 74–75; Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 
F.3d 17, 30 (2d Cir. 2002). 
103 Meyer, 868 F.3d at 75; see Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 
1171, 1177 (9th Cir. 2014). 
104 Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 233; see Meyer, 868 F.3d at 78. 
105 See Cullinane, 839 F.3d at 62. 
106 Meyer, 868 F.3d at 78; see Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 
127 (2d Cir. 2012). 
107 See Cullinane, 839 F.3d at 62; Meyer, 868 F.3d at 77; Nicosia, 834 F.3d 
at 233. 
108 Compare Cullinane, 839 F.3d at 62–63, with Meyer, 868 F.3d at 77–78. 
109 See Cullinane, 839 F.3d at 62; Meyer, 868 F.3d at 77; Nicosia, 834 F.3d 
at 233. 
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person standard is utilized to “define the legal duty to protect 
one’s own interest and that of others.”110 In effect, it “requires 
one to act with the same degree of care, knowledge, experience, 
fair-mindedness, and awareness of the law that the community 
would expect of a hypothetical reasonable person.”111 
 Thus, in determining the conspicuousness of terms for apps, 
the Second Circuit has considered reasonableness through the “per-
spective of a reasonably prudent smartphone user.”112 In Meyer, 
the Second Circuit held that a reasonably prudent smartphone user 
would have knowledge of and would have encountered an app 
and could be presumed to have entered into a contract using a 
smartphone.113 In addition, both the First and Second Circuits 
recognized that a reasonably prudent user would know that a hy-
perlink would take them to another webpage containing addi-
tional information and that hyperlinks are typically identified by 
blue, underlined text.114 Moreover, utilizing hyperlinks to provide 
access to Terms of Service has been upheld as providing reasonable 
notice, as clicking on a hyperlink has been dubbed “the twenty-
first century equivalent of turning over the cruise ticket ... [—]the 
consumer is prompted to examine terms of sale that are located 
somewhere else.”115 Nonetheless, whether terms are valid based on 
their reasonable conspicuousness is a fact-intensive inquiry which 
must be contextualized.116 Courts utilize similar factors in making 
the determination of whether a reasonable user would have in-
quiry notice of an electronic contract’s terms.117 However, such 
static factors as applied to specific, variable facts in cases of dif-
ferent apps may yield different results as technology and user 
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110 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BUSINESS ETHICS AND SOCIETY 1772 (Robert Kolb ed., 
Sage Publ’ns 1st ed. 2008). 
111 Id. 
112 Meyer, 868 F.3d at 77. 
113 See id. 
114 See Cullinane, 839 F.3d at 63; Meyer, 868 F.3d at 77–78. 
115 Meyer, 868 F.3d at 78 (quoting Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 
829, 839 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
116 Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 63 (holding that the objective conspicuousness of 
terms must be put in context with the rest of the display and process, and not 
just “read in a vacuum”); see Meyer, 868 F.3d at 76. 
117 See Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 62–63; Meyer, 868 F.3d at 78; Nicosia v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 233, 236 (2d Cir. 2015). 
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interfaces continue to change. This scenario is exemplified by the 
diverging results in the First and Second Circuit opinions.118 
E.Meyer v. Uber and Cullinane v. Uber: Different Interpretations 
of Contract Principles in the App Context 
 Despite molding well-established principles of contract 
law to evaluate new forms of electronic contracts, when they are 
applied to app-based technology, the outcomes can vary as in 
Meyer and Cullinane.119 As both courts decided the issue on in-
quiry notice, the basic question in both cases was essentially the 
same—was there reasonably conspicuous notice provided to the 
user in light of the user interface?120 In Meyer, the Second Cir-
cuit looked to the interface of the Uber app from the perspective 
of a reasonable smartphone user to determine the conspicuous-
ness of the terms.121 In doing so, the court explicitly noted the 
pervasiveness of smartphone and application use.122 Again, the 
Second Circuit accepted that such a reasonable person would 
understand that blue underlined text constitutes a hyperlink, 
which opens another webpage containing additional information 
and noted some familiarity with mobile contracts.123 The First 
Circuit in Cullinane used a similar “reasonable user” standard to 
answer the same question of assent to terms based on their con-
spicuousness in relation to the user interface.124 Compared to 
the Second Circuit, the First Circuit in Cullinane appears to take a 
less progressive view of mobile technology and user understand-
ing.125 The First Circuit also recognized common understanding 
of a traditional hyperlink, and while it appears open to recognizing 
non-traditional characteristics of hyperlinks,126 it gave signifi-
cant weight to the fact that the hyperlink was not presented in a 
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118 Compare Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 63, with Meyer, 868 F.3d at 78–79. 
119 Compare Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 63, with Meyer, 868 F.3d at 78–79. 
120 See Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 62; Meyer, 868 F.3d at 77–78. 
121 See Meyer, 868 F.3d at 76–77. 
122 See id. at 77. 
123 See id. at 77–78. 
124 See Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 63. 
125 Compare id. at 62, with Meyer, 868 F.3d at 78–79. 
126 Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 63 (“While not all hyperlinks need to have the same 
characteristics, they are ‘commonly blue and underlined.’” (citation omitted)). 
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traditional manner.127 The presentation of the hyperlink in a 
gray rectangular box raised concern as to whether a “reasonable 
user” would have understood that to constitute a hyperlink.128 
 In analyzing the context of the hyperlinked terms in rela-
tion to the rest of the surrounding screen, the First Circuit in 
Cullinane also gave weight to the fact that the screen contained 
other, more conspicuous information, text, and buttons, which 
took away from the conspicuousness of the hyperlinked terms.129 
The court appeared to hone in on the conspicuousness and ap-
pearance of the actual hyperlink as compared to the surrounding 
text on the screen, despite conceding that other features of the 
screen would weigh in favor of Uber.130 While the court deter-
mined that the “white bold font” of the hyperlink could have 
been considered conspicuous on its own, or within a more plain 
and limited screen, it held that in the context of other conspicu-
ous features and text on the screen, the hyperlinked terms be-
came inconspicuous.131 In other words, the court held that “[i]f 
everything on the screen is written with conspicuous features, 
then nothing is conspicuous.”132 
 In contrast, when considering the overall context of the 
screen, the Second Circuit appeared to focus less on the hyper-
link itself, and more so on the interface as a whole.133 The court 
weighed in favor of conspicuousness partly due to the language 
located near the button that signaled manifestation of assent.134 
The Second Circuit reasoned that the language, “[b]y creating an 
Uber account, you agree ... ” clearly signaled to users that they 
would be subject to Uber’s terms of agreement.135 In determin-
ing sufficient notice and assent to the terms, the court coupled 
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127 See id. 
128 See id. 
129 See id. at 63–64. 
130 Id. at 63 (“[T]he language and the number of words found on the ‘Link 
Card’ and ‘Link Payment’ screens could be seen to favor Uber’s position.”). 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 64 (“Even though the hyperlink did possess some of the characteris-
tics that make a term conspicuous, the presence of other terms on the same 
screen with a similar or larger size, typeface, and with more noticeable at-
tributes diminished the hyperlink’s capability to grab the user’s attention.”). 
133 See Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 78 (2d Cir. 2017). 
134 See id. at 78–79. 
135 Id. at 78. 
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the spatial proximity of this language with the fact that the 
screen was uncluttered and entirely visible at once, and that the 
hyperlink itself contrasted with the background of the screen.136 
 While applying the same standard and utilizing similar 
factors in their determination, the Circuits came to opposite con-
clusions about whether the users of the same application were 
put on reasonable notice to the terms of agreement when regis-
tering for the app.137 
 The holdings in Meyer and Cullinane are so contradictory 
because the app at issue and the legal standard applied are the 
same—the Uber app and the reasonable person standard for 
notice.138 The differing outcomes appear to turn on Uber’s mar-
keting and design choices in the relevant time periods.139 While 
the decisions were rendered only a year apart, the interface in 
which the Terms of Service were located and the appearance of 
the registration process were very different given the timing of 
when the plaintiffs registered for Uber.140 
 In Meyer, the plaintiff registered for Uber in 2014.141 In 
2014, the final registration screen was white, with minimal, 
uncluttered text and fillable data forms to insert the user’s pay-
ment method, as reflected in Figure 1.142 Underneath the “Regis-
ter” button in smaller text was the language, “[b]y creating an Uber 
account, you agree to the TERMS OF SERVICE & PRIVACY 
POLICY.”143 This “TERMS OF SERVICE & PRIVACY POLICY” 
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136 Id. 
137 Caleb J. Schillinger, First Circuit Invalidates Arbitration Clause in 
Mobile App User Agreement, SEYFARTH SHAW (July 5, 2018), https://www.con 
sumerclassdefense.com/2018/07/first-circuit-invalidates-arbitration-clause-in-mo 
bil-app-user-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/FY7F-DWPS]. 
138 See Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 839 F.3d 53, 64 (1st Cir. 2018); Meyer, 
868 F.3d at 79. 
139 Compare Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 58, 63, with Meyer, 868 F.3d at 78–79. 
See generally Nathan McAlone, This Is How Uber Used to Look When It First 
Started Out—and How It’s Changed Over Time, BUSINESS INSIDER (Feb. 10, 2016, 
4:54 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/ubers-design-history-2010-2016 
-2016-2 [https://perma.cc/AD6J-UPFM] (presenting a visual timeline of Uber’s 
evolving branding strategy from 2010 to 2016). 
140 Compare Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 56–58, with Meyer, 868 F.3d at 70–71. 
141 Meyer, 868 F.3d at 70. 
142 Id. at 78; see Figure 1. 
143 Meyer, 868 F.3d at 78. 
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text was a blue, underlined hyperlink.144 Despite the small size 
of the text alerting the user to Uber’s terms, the court held that 
the darker font and clearly hyperlinked Terms of Service against 
the backdrop of a plain, white screen that was entirely visible at one 
time were sufficient to make the terms conspicuous and there-
fore provide notice to Uber’s terms.145 
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144 Id. 
145 Id. 
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FIGURE 1. SCREENSHOTS OF REGISTRATION PROCESS IN MEYER146 
 In contrast, the plaintiffs in Cullinane registered for Uber be-
tween the years 2012 and 2014 and experienced a very different 

146 Id. at 81–82. Screenshots in Figure 1 resemble the “actual-size screen-
shot of the last step in the registration process, as it would have appeared on 
Meyer’s Samsung Galaxy S5.” Id. at 78 n.9. While the sizing of the screenshots 
in this Note are not exact, they are copies of the actual-sized screenshots 
utilized by and appended to the court’s opinion.  
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user interface, as reflected in Figure 2.147 While there existed two 
different screen options for payment that could be utilized by plain-
tiffs at this time (“Link Payment” and “Link Card” screens), both 
screens were stylistically the same for purposes of judicial anal-
ysis. During this period, the registration screen had a black 
background with a white text box to type in payment infor-
mation and light gray instructional text.148 Below the fillable 
field for payment was dark gray text that read, “[b]y creating an 
Uber account, you agree to the,” and below that read “Terms of 
Service & Privacy Policy” in bold white text in a gray rectangu-
lar box—a clickable hyperlink that would take users to Uber’s 
terms and privacy policy.149 The court emphasized that the gray 
box containing Uber’s terms did not have the traditional charac-
teristics of a hyperlink.150 Taking this fact into account, in addi-
tion to the rest of the bolded and distinctive text on the screen 
presented at the same time, the court held that the text alerting 
users to the terms was no longer conspicuous and did not pro-
vide reasonable notice to the user.151 
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147 Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 55, 57–58 (1st Cir. 2018). 
Compare Figure 1, with Figure 2. 
148 Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 57–58. 
149 Id. at 57–59. 
150 Id. at 63. 
151 Id. at 63–64. 
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FIGURE 2. SCREENSHOTS OF REGISTRATION 
PROCESS IN CULLINANE152 

 Thus, it appears the Circuits divided due to design differ-
ences in Uber’s user interface and app design, which, according 

152 Id. at 56–58. The screenshots in Figure 2 resemble and “accurately depict 
the content of the Uber App screens presented to the Plaintiffs.” Id. at 56 n.3. 
While the sizing of the screenshots in this Note are not exact, they are copies of 
the actual-sized screenshots utilized by and appended to the court’s opinion. 
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to the First Circuit, did not conform to a traditional concept of 
web contracts.153 This could create an ongoing issue for Uber, 
and many other companies, as design changes and rebranding 
occur frequently.154 Moreover, when the color is stripped away, 
the similarities among the two interfaces are readily apparent.155 
The court in Cullinane noted that Uber’s “Link Payment” and 
“Link Card” screens had a mere twenty-six words and that the 
language, “Terms of Service & Privacy Policy,” would tend to favor 
conspicuousness if not for other features.156 However, the screen 
in Meyer contained approximately twenty-eight words and con-
tained the same language to signal the user to the terms, yet the 
court held that in that context, they were conspicuous.157 Thus, 
despite using similar features and language, as user interfaces 
for apps modernize, the courts may begin to lag behind in what 
a “reasonably prudent user” could be presumed to know, and 
continue to come to differing conclusions regarding notice, even 
when utilizing the same standard.158 
F.Current Mobile App Use and Modern Understanding of  
Technology 
 On its face, using a reasonable smartphone user to de-
termine whether an individual is put on inquiry notice of the 
terms of an app appears to be an appropriate objective indicator 
for notice.159 However, as technology rapidly changes, especially 
in mobile apps, and as the proliferation of app use continues,160 
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153 See id. at 62–64. 
154 See, e.g., McAlone, supra note 139. 
155 Compare Figure 1, with Figure 2. 
156 Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 62–63. 
157 Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 78 (2d Cir. 2017); Figure 1. 
158 See, e.g., Meyer, 868 F.3d at 75, 77–78 (discussing the rapid adoption of 
mobile technology, its evolving applications, and pervasiveness). 
159 See Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 62–63; Meyer, 868 F.3d at 75, 77–78. 
160 See Celine Ledbury et al., Something for Everyone: Why the Growth of 
Mobile Apps Is Good News for Brands, IPSOS MORI 1, 8 (July 2017), https:// 
www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/2017-08/Google-mobile-apps-report-2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LV5T-9NNG]; Joe Parker, 10 Years of Growth of Mobile App 
Market, KNOWBAND, https://www.knowband.com/blog/mobile-app/growth-of-mo 
bile-app-market/ [https://perma.cc/MN7H-LRKM]; Mobile App Trends That 
Will Dominate 2019, EFUTURES (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.efuturesworld.com 
/mobile-app-trends-that-will-dominate-2019/ [https://perma.cc/W2YF-NLUV]. 
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common knowledge of users may be changing faster than the 
courts can apply a standard that adequately captures whether a 
reasonable user would have notice of terms.161 
 In 2017, the number of smartphone users in the United 
States reached 246.6 million and is projected to reach 285.3 mil-
lion by 2023.162 Of smartphone users between the ages of 18 and 
64, over 90 percent use apps.163 The average smartphone user 
has between 60 and 90 apps downloaded to their phone, spend-
ing an average of 2 hours and 15 minutes per day using at least 
9 apps per day.164 In 2016, overall app usage increased by 11 
percent and the amount of time that people spent using apps grew 
by 69 percent.165 As apps become even more pervasive and are 
created for use in nearly every aspect of people’s lives, the mar-
ket for them is expected to double to nearly $290 billion by 2024. 
People’s phones have become flooded with apps.166 Not only are 
app users gaining a more specialized knowledge in functionality 

161 See, e.g., Meyer, 868 F.3d at 75, 77–78. 
162 Number of Smartphone Users in the United States from 2010 to 2023 (in 
millions)*, STATISTA (Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/201182 
/forecast-of-smartphone-users-in-the-us/ [https://perma.cc/9ENT-A3PP]. 
163 Ledbury et al., supra note 160, at 8. 
164 Ben Lovejoy, The Average Smartphone User Spends 2h 15m a Day Using 
Apps—How About You?, 9 TO 5 MAC (May 5, 2017, 7:17 AM), https://9to5mac 
.com/2017/05/05/average-app-user-per-day/ [https://perma.cc/5C87-E92M]; Sarah 
Perez, Report: Smartphone Owners are Using 9 Apps Per Day, 30 Per Month, TECH 
CRUNCH (May 4, 2017, 1:16 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2017/05/04/report 
-smartphone-owners-are-using-9-apps-per-day-30-per-month/ [https://perma 
.cc/6NYP-TM8F]. 
165 Simon Khalaf, On Their Tenth Anniversary, Mobile Apps Start Eating 
Their Own, FLURRY ANALYTICS BLOG (Jan. 12, 2017), https://flurrymobile 
.tumblr.com/post/155761509355/on-their-tenth-anniversary-mobile-apps-start 
[https://perma.cc/B68Q-E38U]. 
166 Neil Petch, There’s an App for That: Seven Apps Entrepreneurs Should 
Make Use Of, ENTREPRENEUR MIDDLE EAST (Mar. 26, 2017), https://www.entrepre 
neur.com/article/291928 [https://perma.cc/3HXU-E2A4]; see Bobby Emamian, 
To Make Your App Stand Out in a Saturated Market, Offer Users What They 
Really Want, FORBES (Apr. 9, 2015, 9:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites 
/theyec/2015/04/09/to-make-your-app-stand-out-in-a-saturated-market-offer-users 
-what-they-really-want/#6d8f6d877aba [https://perma.cc/A9WS-XGCQ] (“On the 
smartphone Monopoly board, app real estate used to be like Baltic Avenue. 
But with the massive number of available apps and the finite amount of storage 
space on smartphones, it’s now more like Park Place and is quickly approach-
ing Boardwalk status.”). 
556 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:531 
and use of apps, but app developers are trying to keep up with 
competition through the advancement of superior interfaces, 
which in turn improve app usability and experience.167 
 As everyday technology, smartphone technology, and apps 
evolve, app users are developing an expanded common knowledge 
base of how apps typically work and what their use entails.168 
Users’ common knowledge is evident by the fact that users have 
become familiar with certain screens, such as “Getting Started” 
screens and other design features recognized even by the court 
in Cullinane.169 It is further supported by the fact that “[p]redict-
ability is a fundamental principle of [user interface] design,” 
indicating that regardless of the app, users learn and adapt to 
interfaces across application type.170 App users understand far 
more than “blue plus underline equals hyperlink”; they are cur-
rently gaining a common knowledge of gestures—“the new 
clicks.”171 Far beyond the blue text hyperlinks of past websites, 
multi-touch technology, through which users can tap, pinch, spread, 
and swipe, has become mainstream since Apple introduced it with 
the iPhone.172 Users have quickly adapted to this technology and 
prefer to use it.173 
 By recognizing this common knowledge among users and 
by taking into account user preferences, companies that utilize apps 
are strategizing their entry, prevalence, or permanence in the 
market through streamlining and enhancing user experience.174 
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167 See Nick Babich, A Comprehensive Guide to Mobile App Design, 
SMASHING MAGAZINE (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.smashingmagazine.com/20 
18/02/comprehensive-guide-to-mobile-app-design/ [https://perma.cc/J3WA-479P]; 
Emamian, supra note 166. 
168 See Babich, supra note 167 (stating that app users are familiar with cer-
tain screens that have “become de facto standards for mobile apps” which “don’t 
require additional explanation because users are already familiar with them”). 
169 See Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 58, 63 (1st Cir. 2018) 
(“[W]ithin the gray bar, [is] an illustration of three circles connected by a green 
line. These circles indicated the user’s progress through Uber’s registration 
process.”); Babich, supra note 167. 
170 Babich, supra note 167. 
171 Nick Babich, In-App Gestures and Mobile App User Experience, SMASHING 
MAGAZINE (Oct. 6, 2016), https://www.smashingmagazine.com/2016/10/in-app 
-gestures-and-mobile-app-user-experience/ [https://perma.cc/Y5AM-5D5S]. 
172 Id. 
173 See id. 
174 See Babich, supra note 167; Emamian, supra note 166. 
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Streamlining and simplification includes minimizing cognitive 
load by decluttering, reducing user effort, and minimizing user 
data input.175 Enhancing user experience consists of anticipating 
user needs and putting the user in control by keeping the app 
interactive, familiar, and predictable.176 Visual design across the 
board is an important feature in order to create an accessible 
and navigable interface using bold, contrasting colors and visual 
cues, animations, and gestures.177 A key aspect and common 
theme of a good user interface across developers and designers is 
having a simple and familiar design.178 
 For businesses utilizing arbitration agreements, this means 
that through enhanced design and use of gestures, companies 
have the ability to declutter their app to “leav[e] more space for 
valuable content” and “make[ ] the app content-focused.”179 Still, 
in moving away from traditional design and in an attempt to 
integrate branding, businesses have the common design question 
of how to emphasize a particular section in an app.180 Companies 
like Intuit feel as if “call[s] to action” are a good opportunity to 
“incorporate brand elements, such as [their] ecosystem green color 
or line iconography.”181 By integrating their brand into their de-
sign, Intuit has “deliberately moved away from using text as calls 
to action, and instead use buttons with high contrast.”182 Inte-
grating a brand into a company’s mobile app experience is a vital 
strategic move because brand identification has become “the 
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175 Babich, supra note 167. 
176 Id. 
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178 See 11 App Features, Trends & Innovations in Mobile Development, 
MOBIDEV (Apr. 1, 2018), https://mobidev.biz/blog/11_key_features_of_a_suc 
cessful_mobile_app [https://perma.cc/2F9C-NJLE]; Babich, supra note 167; 
Emamian, supra note 166; Harnil Oza, Importance of UI/UX Design in the 
Development of Mobile Apps, HYPERLINK INFOSYSTEM (Oct. 17, 2017), https:// 
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179 Babich, supra note 171. 
180 See Yvonne So, Designing for Mobile Apps: Overall Principles, Common 
Patterns, and Interface Guidelines, MEDIUM (May 12, 2017), https://medium 
.com/blueprint-by-intuit/native-mobile-app-design-overall-principles-and-com 
mon-patterns-26edee8ced10 [https://perma.cc/GK5W-BTYL]. 
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cornerstone of the customer relationship” due to the fact that “cus-
tomers live on mobile first.”183 This methodology is not ill-founded; 
a York University case study found that “custom mobile safety apps 
received ... 50–100x more downloads than generic apps,” evi-
dencing users’ preference for branded apps over generic apps.184 
 Thus, based on app prevalence and the modern user’s un-
derstanding and experience with them, businesses have been 
leveraging the design of their user interface to compete in the 
app market and strengthen their branding.185 However, given 
the current environment after the First and Second Circuit deci-
sions in Cullinane and Meyer,186 businesses may need to forego 
some aspects of user experience in order to be more conscientious 
of a legal standard that is not keeping pace with app users.187 
III.REDEFINING VALIDITY OF TERMS FOR APP USERS 
 Determining the validity of terms by notice and acceptance 
in apps should be updated to reflect the current knowledge and 
skill of app users.188 The current legal standard for determining 
the validity of mobile contract terms is assessed by means of having 
notice via reasonably conspicuous terms.189 Given that app use 
is so prevalent and carries with it a common understanding of 
app use, inquiry notice based on the conspicuousness of terms 
through the lens of a reasonable user should take into account 
the heightened knowledge and skill of the average app user.190 
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183 Tobias Dengel, Four Ways to Rethink the Brand App Experience, FORBES 
(June 11, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/06/11/four 
-ways-to-rethink-the-brand-app-experience/#71b6291f5e4e [https://perma.cc 
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185 See Mindfire Solutions, 7 Important Mobile App Branding Strategies, 
MEDIUM (Jan. 25, 2018), https://medium.com/@mindfiresolutions.usa/7-important  
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186 See Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 64 (1st Cir. 2018); Meyer 
v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 79–80 (2d Cir. 2017). 
187 See Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 63. 
188 See Meyer, 868 F.3d at 77. 
189 See Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 62; Meyer, 868 F.3d at 76.  
190 See Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 62; Meyer, 868 F.3d at 77. 
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Such a standard would reflect the fact that app users have a 
heightened base knowledge and skill from their experience using 
apps.191 Further, it would account for the reality that fewer than 
10 percent of individuals consent to legal terms after actually 
reading them.192 While a redefined standard encompassing these 
realities may anticipate some shortfalls, there are many ways to 
mitigate these downsides while still allowing businesses to adapt 
with advancing technology.193 
A.Understanding the Scope of Who Reads Terms 
 While contract law typically will not bind a party to an in-
conspicuous term,194 the unfortunate reality for technology users 
is that these users rarely actually read terms of service, whether 
or not they are faced with having to agree in the affirmative.195 
Nonetheless, the current standard places heavy emphasis on 
whether the terms, or access to the terms, are conspicuous.196 
 A Deloitte study of consumers found that 91 percent of 
people “consent to legal terms and services conditions without 
reading them,” a statistic which rises to 97 percent for those in 
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in apps); Babich, supra note 171 (noting user familiarity of common gestures 
such as tap, double tap, drag, pinch, and spread); Gabriel Shaoolian, Key 
Functionalities Your Mobile App Design Needs to Invest In, FORBES (Oct. 4, 
2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/gabrielshaoolian/2017/10/04/key-function 
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Agreements, BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.businessinsider 
.com/deloitte-study-91-percent-agree-terms-of-service-without-reading-2017-11 
[https://perma.cc/6DHG-4Y4Y]. 
193 See, e.g., Martha Neil, Litigation Over Arbitration, A.B.A. J. (Jan. 
2005), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/litigation_over_arbitration 
[https://perma.cc/FDQ8-8BAA]. 
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https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jun/15/i-read-all-the-small-print 
-on-the-internet [https://perma.cc/2X9F-AUSR]. 
196 See, e.g., Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 63–64; Meyer, 868 F.3d at 77–78. 
560 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:531 
the age range of 18 to 34—the heaviest app users.197 A York 
University study, through which student subjects were confronted 
with agreeing to privacy and service agreements of NameDrop, a 
fictitious network app, confirmed this statistic.198 NameDrop’s 
terms required the subject users to “give NameDrop their future 
first-born children.”199 In that study, only roughly a quarter of 
students “even bothered to look at the fine print,” and even so, all 
of the students agreed to the terms, which makes user’s affir-
mance of acceptance to terms “the biggest lie on the internet.”200 
 Further, whether or not users are actually confronted 
with the terms to which they must agree raises two additional 
issues that are not likely to be solved by the reasonably conspic-
uous standard: (1) the terms are extremely lengthy and often writ-
ten in legal jargon, and (2) users would not have the bargaining 
power to negotiate their terms of use anyway.201 Taking the time 
to read an “average American’s digital contracts” would exhaust 
almost 250 hours per year, with most individuals being con-
fronted with a single 21,586-word user agreement just for their 
Apple smartphone and any Apple apps.202 The terms are typically 
difficult to read, not only in terms of legibility and clarity, but also 
in substance.203 This is in part due to the legal requirements of 
conspicuousness and partly because of the attempt to encompass 
a myriad of legal situations in one text.204 Apart from how illegi-
ble terms can be, mustering through reading them will not give 
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make up NameDrop’s privacy and service agreements”). 
201 Id.; Hern, supra note 195. 
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204 Id. (stating that all-caps is hard to read, but, “[s]ince there’s no corre-
sponding requirement that it be legible, the consensus is that capitalising the 
necessary parts fits the bill”). 
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a user any extra bargaining power.205 For example, even if a 
reader of terms does disagree with a clause, the only solution is 
to not use it; reading the terms does not give you an opportunity 
to negotiate out of a particular term.206 Nonetheless, even if users 
become aware of a term that they dislike, it is unlikely that they 
will stop using an application that they are loyal to.207 
B.Redefining a Reasonable Person Standard for App Users 
 A modern standard would be to incorporate a heightened 
technological understanding into a “reasonable app user” stand-
ard and allow reasonable access to the terms to suffice for in-
quiry notice. App users should constitute a special group among 
all individuals such that they are held to a heightened standard 
of knowledge and skill, like professionals and tradespeople.208 
Accordingly, by engaging in app activity, including registering 
and entering into app contracts, all app users should be held to 
the same level of responsibility, regardless of experience level, just 
as newly licensed drivers are held to the same standard as expe-
rienced drivers.209 Modern app users understand what various 
types of hyperlinks look like, and they understand what the various 
screens mean when they are first downloading or registering an 
app as well as when they are using it. Additionally, modern app 
users understand what the language “Terms and Conditions” 
means and what constitutes entering into such contracts.210 Hold-
ing app users to this standard compels the user to understand 
the implications of using an app, and the fact that they are be-
ing subjected to contractual provisions in terms and conditions 
agreements.211 This incorporates a common understanding of the 
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current paradigm of app users into the legal standard, in a simi-
lar manner to how general contractual principles interpret a 
contract to have the meaning that a reasonable person would 
give it “if he knew everything he should plus everything he ac-
tually knew.”212 
 This modern, redefined standard may have been one that 
both the First and Second Circuits attempted to apply in Cullinane 
and Meyer,213 but without fully understanding the extent of an 
average app user’s knowledge. This may be partly due to the fact 
that judges add a layer of subjectivity on to the objective stand-
ard of a reasonable person.214 Consequently, a redefined stand-
ard should incorporate this knowledge such that reasonable 
access to the terms suffices for a user having inquiry notice of 
the terms.215 Reasonable access affords app users the opportunity 
to review terms before use, if they so choose, but will not impede 
businesses from designing and branding their app in a progres-
sive way.216 So long as a user has the ability to reasonably ac-
cess the terms before they register or use an app, and so long as 
the terms are not hidden or absent in any way, the user will be 
put on inquiry notice of these terms.217 Thus, by providing a 
hyperlink to the terms on a page during the registration process, 
regardless of the level of conspicuousness, the screens in both 
Cullinane and Meyer would have provided a user with reasona-
ble access to the terms.218 In such a standard, utilization of the 
app itself would constitute a user’s manifestation of assent, 
much like the all-familiar browsewrap agreements.219 
C.Addressing Additional Consumer Protection 
 This redefined standard is not without its shortcomings. 
While a learning curve is still underway for app technology, it 
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could present issues for unknowing users.220 However, while this 
standard attempts to take into account technological advance-
ments and future learning, regulation of the language of mobile 
contract terms containing arbitration clauses should be advocated 
for in order to protect users with a more limited knowledge.221 
For example, rather than making the terms conspicuous, terms 
can be signaled by the same language across all apps, such as 
“Terms and Conditions” or “Terms of Service” so that all users 
know what to look for and what the language means.222 Further, 
in exchange for the ability to present and design an app as a 
business chooses, regulations can require that arbitration clauses 
contain more consumer-friendly provisions.223 
 Notwithstanding any additional consumer protection, 
while arbitration can become costly to the consumer, some argue 
that it is “look[ing] more and more like litigation,” in that it is both 
thorough and tailored.224 Moreover, if consumers become more 
active in reading the terms that they are subject to, they may find 
that opt-out provisions are included in such terms, to which they 
can object or abstain from a provision that they do not want.225 
CONCLUSION 
 Cullinane and Meyer reflect a current standard that allows 
for different judicial interpretations of app-based contracts con-
taining arbitration terms.226 While the FAA strongly favors en-
forcement of arbitration agreements, analyzing mobile contracts 
for conspicuousness of terms based on a reasonable person standard 
does not necessarily further this policy, depending on how much 
knowledge the judge affords the “reasonable smartphone user”.227 A 
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redefined standard to apply in the context of app-based terms of 
service that include arbitration agreements should analyze the 
app interface in terms of a reasonable app user, incorporating 
such a user’s common technological knowledge and the fact that 
users are reasonably aware that they are subject to terms when 
they use apps.228 Taking into account this heightened knowledge, 
reasonable access to the terms of a mobile app should be suffi-
cient to satisfy inquiry notice for purposes of validating terms.229 
This standard not only accounts for the current understanding 
of app users but will incorporate a progressive understanding of 
new and modernized technology.230 Further, it will allow busi-
nesses to tailor their mobile apps toward a more in-demand and 
engaging user interface while also allowing businesses to build 
their brand given that they can be less consumed with designing 
solely with “conspicuous terms” in mind.231 
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